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INDIAN LANDS ENVIRONMENTWHO SHOULD PROTECT IT*
J. KEMPER WILL**

INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent flourish of interest on the part of Indian
tribes in programs for environmental protection as they relate to
Indian land. No doubt a quiver full of individual reasons could
account for this interest, but it is the author's perception that tribal

interests in energy development and self-determination have played
no small part.'
Until recently, there has been an almost complete absence of formal environmental regulation by Indian tribes.2 The need for
environmental regulation in a rural setting was not always as pressing
as urban needs, but it is also true that existing environmental problems were sometimes not recognized or acted upon. Tribal councils
deemed other social problems to be of greater need.
The 1970's brought the passage of intensive federal environmental
legislation,' and the federal grant programs under this legislation
have spawned the growth of state environmental programs that are
now beginning to affect Indian reservations. Both states and Indian
tribes are being cautious about environmental regulation, not wishing
to give up jurisdiction, but also not yet sure what is really at stake.
*This article was written by the author in his private capacity. No official support or
endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency or any other agency of the federal
government is intended or should be inferred.
**Assistant Regional Counsel, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region
VIII, Denver, Colorado.
1. See THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON
INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENT: OIL, GAS, COAL AND OTHER MINERALS (1976);
McGee, .Indian Lands: Coal Development: Environmental/EconomicDilemma for the Modern Indian, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 279 (1976); and Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §450 (Supp. V 1975).
2. The Navajo Nation has enacted an ordinance which established an Environmental Protection Commission with authority to adopt and enforce environmental regulations. The
Commission has been very active. It recently adopted a regulation which established a tax
on excess sulphur emissions from power plants within the reservation. The Crow Tribe, by
Resolution No. 76-22 B, adopted a comprehensive Environmental Health and Sanitation
Ordinance (Jan. 31, 1976). On June 6, 1977, the Secretary of the Interior approved the
environmental regulations of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe enacted by the tribe to govern
mineral development and oil and gas leasing activities on tribal and allotted land within the
reservation. This was the first time a tribe's environmental regulations had been accepted in
place of the Department's general regulations.
3. See notes 12-18 infra.
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Of course, programs to control pollution on reservations have been
provided by federal agencies even before the enactment of federal
environmental legislation. Since 1954, the Surgeon General, and later
the Indian Health Service, has been tasked with the provisions of
health, drinking water, and sanitation facilities for Indian reservations.' The Bureau of Indian Affairs, in cooperation with the Soil
Conservation Service, has provided training programs in the areas of
conservation, pesticide use, and management of solid waste.' The
Department of Housing and Urban Development has provided septic
tank facilities for HUD-funded housing on Indian lands.6 A few
tribes have enacted environmental controls, although not in a comprehensive manner.
Federal agencies are also required by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 7 to prepare environmental impact statements for activities on Indian lands which involve major federal
action. Although there was initially uncertainty over whether NEPA
applied to federal activities involving Indian tribes, the case of Davis
v. Morton8 held, in 1972, that federal agency lease approval constituted a major federal action and thus must comply with the requirements of NEPA.9
The centralization of federal environmental effort in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'I in 1970 did not really affect
Indian reservations as it did states and localities. The states benefited
from an infusion of funds under the grant programs of the new
environmental legislation, which also provided EPA with an assortment of "sticks" to prod the states when necessary. EPA has provided some of its services to Indian tribes, but normally only in
response to a Tribal request.' ' Initially, there was little EPA policy
recognition of the unique jurisdiction of Indian tribes.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that considerable confu4. 42 U.S.C. §2004a (1970) and 25 U.S.C.A. § §1601-61 (Supp. 1978).
5. 25 U.S.C. chs. 8-14 (1970).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1701 etseq. (1970).
7. 42 U.S.C. § §4321-47 (1970).
8. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
9. See also Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975). Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community v. Kleppe, No. CIV-76-601 PHX-WPC (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 1976). See also
listings under Environmental Regulation: National Environmental Policy Act, in National
Indian Law Library, Catalogue-An Index to Indian Legal Materials and Resources (1976
Cumulative Ed.).
10. The Environmental Protection Agency was established by Reorganization Plan No. 3,
35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970), 5 U.S.C. Reorg. Plan of 1970 No. 3 (1970).
11. For example, a few Indian wastewater treatment plants are being constructed with
funding from EPA grants; EPA has assisted Tribes with solid waste management; water
discharge permits have been issued by EPA to facilities on Indian reservations, usually
municipal or school wastewater treatment plants or irrigation water discharges.
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sion exists regarding respective authorities and responsibilities of
Indian tribes, federal agencies, and states for environmental protection of Indian lands. This article will undertake the ambitious goal of
meshing the complexities of environmental law with the complexities
of Indian law in an attempt to present a conceptual scheme of
respective responsibilities.
THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMEWORK
In the last few years, the United States Congress has passed aggressive legislation in the environmental field containing a complex set of
programs for protecting nearly every aspect of the environment.
These statutes unavoidably have become a framework for the consideration of environmental issues. Without diminishing the importance of independent tribal authorities, to which we will return, we
will first address the effect of this federal framework on the environment of Indian lands. This seminal question must be split into two
issues: whether the federal statutes apply at all to Indian or Indian
lands; and, whether these statutes confer upon states environmental
jurisdiction over Indian lands.
One must read carefully the EPA statutes to find any mention of
Indians or Indian tribes, and until recent amendments in 1977, even
the legislative history of the acts was completely devoid of mention
of Indian tribes. The first major environmental statute enacted-the
Clean Air Act of 1970-contained no mention of Indians. 1 2 The
Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended in 1970,1 did include Indian
tribes within the definition of the term "municipality" but contained
no other mention of Indians or Indian tribes. The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, as amended in 1972, contained the same mention of Indians only in the definition of the term "municipality."' 4
However, the Noise Control Act of 19721 1 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, as amended in 1975,1 6 again
made no mention of Indians. The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1975
returned to the inclusion of Indians in the "municipality" definition.' I The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 again made no
12. 42 U.S.C. § §1857-58a (1970).
13. 42 U.S.C. § § 3251-59 (1970), now recodified as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § §6901-87 (1977). "The term 'municipality'
...means a city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or other public body created by or
pursuant to State law, with responsibility for the planning or administration of solid waste
§ 6903.
Id.
I.."
management, or an Indian tribe .
14. 33 U.S.C. § §1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
15. 42 U.S.C. § §4901-18 (Supp. V 1975).
16. 7 U.S.C. §136-136y (Supp. V 1975).
17. 42 U.S.C. §300f(10) (Supp. V 1975).
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mention of Indians.' 8 It wasn't until amendments to the Clean Air
Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the Safe Drinking
Water Act in 1977 that Congress finally ventured beyond the definitional sections to mention Indians in any substantive provisions, and
then only cautiously." 9
Given this lack of clear Congressional expression of applicability
to Indian tribes, some tribes have argued that the provisions of the
EPA statutes should not apply to Indians at all, and further, that it
would be inconsistent for the federal government as trustee or
guardian of Indian lands to be placing environmental restrictions on
Indian land or tribes.20
In spite of these tribal objections, it appears well settled in case
law that federal statutes of a general nature such as the environmental statutes should apply to Indians and Indian tribes just as any
other persons. In the first place, it is an oft-repeated axiom that
Congress has plenary power over the activities of Indian tribes. 2 1
Congress has the right and responsibility to assure protection of
tribal lands environmentally just as in any other manner. Secondly,
the case of FederalPower Commission v. TuscaroraIndian Nation is
now routinely quoted for the general proposition:
The Federal Power Act constitutes a complete and comprehensive
plan for the development and improvement of navigation and for the
development, transmission and utilization of electric power in any of
the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its commerce powers, and upon the public lands and
reservations of the United States under its property powers. See
§4(e). It neither overlooks nor excludes Indians or lands owned or
occupied by them.... The Act gives every indication that, within its
comprehensive plan, Congress intended to include lands
owned or
22
occupied by any person or persons, including Indians.
The general proposition can be rescinded, however, where a tribe
raises a specific right under a treaty or statute which is in conflict
with the general law to be applied.2 3 It is possible that a treaty
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § §2601-29 (Supp. 1978).
19. See notes 99-113 infra and accompanying text.
20. Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review Commission, Task Force Four:
Federal, State, and Tribal Jurisdiction 34-35 (1976); P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETRICH & F.
TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 47 (1977);
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); see also M. PRICE, LAW AND
THE AMERICAN INDIAN: READINGS, NOTES AND CASES 276-93 (1973).
21. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 501 (1958);
Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review Commission, supra note 20, at 2.
22. 362 U.S. 99, 118 (1960); accord, Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961).
23. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th
Cir. 1974).

July 1978]

INDIAN LANDS ENVIRONMENT

between the United States and an Indian tribe could contain language which would be broad enough to exempt a tribe from coverage
of all or specific provisions of federal environmental acts.
There is little doubt that the environmental legislation, both as
individual acts and in the aggregate, constitutes a complete and comprehensive plan for environmental protection of all lands. For
example, under section 101 of the Clean Air Act, Congress notes that
the primary purpose of the act is "to protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population .. "24 The
very first line of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act states:
"The objectives of this act are to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters." '2 s The
Administrator is empowered to ".... prepare or develop comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or eliminating the pollution
of the navigable waters and groundwaters and improving the sanitary
condition of surface and underground waters." 2 6 The Noise Control
Act of 1972 states: "The Congress declares that it is the policy of the
United States to promote an environment for all Americans
free
2
from the noise that jeopardizes their health or welfare." 7
The legislative history of each of the acts is replete with indications of the same comprehensiveness. For example, the Senate
Report on the Clean Air Act of 1970 so noted:
In sum, this bill would extend the Clean Air Act of 1963 as amended
in 1965, 1966, and 1967 to provide a much more intensive and
comprehensive attack on air pollution. It would establish that the air
is a public resource, and that those who would use that resource
must protect it from abuse, to assure the protection of the health of
every American. 2 8
Therefore, the comprehensiveness of the environmental legislation
presents a strong argument that the rationale of the Tuscarora case
would apply equally to the environmental legislation.2" However, it
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V 1975).
26. Id. §1252.
27. 42 U.S.C. §4901 (Supp. V 1975).
28. SEN. REP. NO. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
29. The NEPA cases noted supra note 9 provide additional support for the general
application of federal environmental statutes to Indian lands. The courts have held that
"NEPA is a very broad statute covering both substantive and procedural problems relating
to the environment." Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 598 (10th Cir. 1972). This case cited
Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora in holding that "[t] he fact Indian lands are held in
trust does not take it out of NEPA's jurisdiction." Id. at 597. In the recent case of Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977), it is noted that NEPA is designed to address
national environmental interests, and while tribal interests may not coincide with national
interests, the court found "nothing in NEPA which exempts Indian lands from national
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is necessary to carefully distinguish the general application of federal
legislation to Indians from the conferral to states of jurisdiction over
Indians-an issue that will be discussed in detail below. 3 0
There are also sound policy reasons for Congress to include Indian
tribes within the coverage of the environmental legislation. Pollution
is ambient in nature and has no regard for jurisdictional boundaries.
Prevailing winds blow air pollutants from one jurisdiction to another.
Pollutants discharged into streams meander through many jurisdictions before spilling into the oceans. Toxicants from solid waste
disposal sites can enter into the groundwater and contaminate drinking water sources many miles from the source of the pollutants. Lack
of at least federal control over such sources on Indian lands could
mean that an extensive and expensive effort by neighboring jurisdictions would be defeated.
From the above, the most reasonable conclusion is that Congress
simply did not give a great deal of thought to the applicability of its
comprehensive environmental legislation to Indian tribes. Indians are
not specifically mentioned in several of the statutes, and there is
almost no legislative history regarding Indian tribes. Consequently,
the intentions of Congress are not clear. However, given the nowaccepted maxim of the Tuscarora holding, and since the environmental enactments were intended to be comprehensive, the environmental statutes should apply to Indian tribes as a general matter.
STATE JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN LANDS
The most debated issue regarding environmental protection of
Indian lands is the question of state jurisdiction. That there should
be uncertainty over the respective authorities of states and Indian
tribes is curious in itself in that one would presume that Congress
long ago would have resolved such an important issue. But given the
flip-flop history of Indian law, it is not surprising that jurisdiction
endures as a crucial issue for Indian tribes." 1
environmental policy." Id. at 559. Of course, NEPA does not directly impose responsibilities on Indian tribes since NEPA only requires federal agencies to prepare environmental
impact statements for major federal actions significantly affecting the environment. Since
tribes are not federal agencies, they do not themselves have to prepare impact statements
under NEPA. Will, Environmental Protectionof Indian Lands and Application of N.E.P.A.,
in THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, supra note 1, paper no. 8.
The other environmental statutes would thus differ from NEPA to the extent that they
impose environmental responsibilities on the tribes.
30. See note 31 infra.
31. Cf Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review Commission, supra note 20,
at 15-23.
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With the current federal policy of Indian self-determination, 3 2
tribes are particularly concerned with the protection of their own
sovereignty, and this concern is especially acute over anything to do
with tribal lands, waters within a reservation, or a tribe's economic
development. Tribes are jealous of .their sovereignty against any
encroachment by state jurisdiction which may interfere with tribal
decisions regarding their land and development. The long history of
the federal trustee/guardian relationship with Indian tribes and of
federal economic support of tribal needs and activities no doubt has
also fostered a preference among tribes to deal with federal rather
than with state agencies. 33
On the other hand, most states would like to have environmental
jurisdiction over Indian lands, some states being more overt in
expressing this desire. 3 4 The states find Indian lands an anomoly
within the state, and they do not like the resultant gaps in their
authority within the state's geographical boundaries. Given the
ambient nature of pollution, states would like to have uniformity in
their ability to control the sources of pollution.3 In addition, the
patchwork ownership pattern within the reservations, especially in
the western states, frequently causes legal uncertainty, distrust, and
ill-will between Indians and other citizens of the state when there is a
disparity of control requirements. This is particularly so when the
disparity can lead to a real or potential economic competitive advantage.
It is axiomatic that Indian tribes are a unique aggregation within a
state, possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members
and their territory.3 6 It is equally axiomatic that states generally do
32. Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. §450-450n (Supp. V 1975).
The Congress hereby recognizes the obligation of the United States to respond
to the strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian participation in the direction of education as well as
other Federal services to Indian communities so as to render such services
more responsive to the needs and desires of those communities.
Id. §450a.
33. Cf Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review Commission, Task Force
Two: Tribal Government, ch. 1 (1976).
34. The State of Arizona asserts jurisdiction over all tribal lands within the state regarding air and water pollution, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §36-1801 (air) and §36-1865 (water).
Arizona's assertion is questionable because Arizona did not remove its constitutional disclaimer (ARIZ. CONST. art. XX) but merely took "affirmative legislative action" by including Indians in the air and water statutes. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423
(1971).
35. For an analogous argument in the land use area, see Reynolds, Aqua Caliente Revisited: Recent Developments as to Zoning of Indian Reservations, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV:
257 (1976).
36. Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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not have jurisdiction over the tribes or their territory unless they are
expressly given jurisdiction by an Act of Congress.3' 7 The question to
be resolved, then, is whether any Act of Congress has given states
jurisdiction over Indian lands for environmental purposes.
a. EnvironmentalCase Law Involving Indians
There have been no definitive environmental cases involving
Indians which have resolved this question. Several cases filed raised
Indian environmental issues but were dismissed on procedural
grounds and did not reach the merits. 3" In another case, several
industrial petitioners challenged the applicability to Indian lands of
EPA's regulations for the prevention of significant deterioration of
air quality. 3 9 However, the court of appeals declined to rule on the
issue on the grounds of ripeness.
We pretermit this question as we find that the issue is not yet ripe
for review. No federal or Indian land has yet been redesignated, and
to that extent we cannot be certain how a conflict may evolve. If the
Administrator were to approve, as replacements for these regulations, individual state plans which do not include the powers granted
to federal land managers and Indian governing bodies, the problems
foreseen by petitioners might never arise. 40
The first land redesignation under these regulations was, in fact,
Indian land, reclassified to a more protective air quality designation
by the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in Montana .4 1 It is likely that
litigation will result from this action since the reclassification may
restrict proposed expansion of power plant units to be constructed
37. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
38. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Ruckelshaus, Civil No. 125-73 (D.C.D.C. May 23, 1973)
(dismissing suit to compel EPA to publish final regulations governing air quality for Arizona,
Utah, and New Mexico). Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (dismissing suit challenging EPA refusal to revise standards for new coal-fired
power plants because of improper court).
One water rights case reached the merits. In Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (also known as Akin v. United States) the Court found
Indian water users to be subject to state court jurisdiction. Although the McCarron Amendment (43 U.S.C. §666 (1970)) did not mention Indians, the Court held that the "legislative
history demonstrates that the McCarron Amendment is to be construed as reaching federal
water rights reserved on behalf of Indians." 424 U.S. 800, 811 (1976). See also id. at 812-13
no. 20. Another case related to the environment was Sangre de Cristo Development Corp.,
Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323 (1972). The court denied application of
local planning and subdivision control authority to lessee of Indian land. See also Norvell v.
Sangre de Cristo Development Corp., Inc., 372 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.M. 1974), rev'don other
grounds, 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975).
39. Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 1139 (footnotes omitted).
41. 42 Fed. Reg. 40,695 (1977).
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by Montana Power Compoany at the Colstrip mine near the reservation. Legal challenges to this action have been filed, but have not yet
reached the merits.4 2
Although definitive environmental cases regarding Indians lands
are lacking, other available authorities not specifically applicable to
environmental issues do provide a basis for analyzing federal statutes
to determine the degree of state jurisdiction, if any, over environmental matters on Indian lands.
b. Recent Major Indian Law Cases
The Supreme Court has outlined the general framework by which
Indian jurisdiction cases are to be analyzed. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, the Court stated that:
the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal
pre-emption. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones. ... [411 U.S.
145 (1973)]. The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the appli43
cable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.
Despite all the lip service paid to the doctrine of federal preemption in post-McClanahan cases" 4 the McClanahan court itself
deprecated the importance of the analysis in a footnote.
The extent of federal pre-emption and residual Indian sovereignty in
the total absence of federal treaty obligations or legislation is therefore now something of a moot question. Cf. Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 62 (1962); Federal Indian Law 846. The
question is generally of little more than theoretical importance, however, since in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes define the
boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction. 45
Pre-emption as an analytical tool may be somewhat of a misnomer
since in practice the courts tend to posit pre-emption as a given and
4
then employ the canons of construction as the analytical tool. 6
Nevertheless, analysis of the federal statutes is required.
42. Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, Petition for Review, No. 77-3058 (9th

Cir. 1977).
43. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
44. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Fort Mojave Tribe v. County
of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,

376 n.2 (1976).

45. 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.8 (1973).
46. "[S] tatutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes ... are to be liberally
construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians." Northern Cheyenne
Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976), cited in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 392 (1976). The same canon was noted in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
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The appropriate federal statutes to be analyzed, following
McClanahan, are the EPA enabling statutes, Public Law 280, and any
other federal statute that confers to states jurisdiction over Indian
lands. If these statutes do not indicate a pre-emption of state jurisdiction, the state action need only satisfy the test laid down in Williams
v. Lee, namely, that it not infringe on the rights of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
c. EPA EnablingStatutes
As noted above, the EPA enabling statutes contain little specific
mention of Indian tribes nor do they specifically authorize states to
exercise environmental jurisdiction over Indian lands,4 8 and given
the comprehensiveness of the environmental statutes,4 9 it is not
difficult to argue that these statutes do constitute a complete federal
pre-emption of state authority. However, the somewhat unique
federal/state cooperative effort laid out in the environmental statutes
has led some to argue that states have been delegated authority over
Indian lands for environmental purposes . 5 The argument is that the
federal environmental legislation establishes an overlapping federal/
state program that provides federal funding, research, coordination,
and cooperation and state administration and enforcement of the
program.
The basic scheme of the statutes is for the state to take the lead in
environmental protection with the federal government providing the
funding and supportive prodding. The Clean Air Act is a good
example. In discussing the relative authority of the federal and state
governments, the Supreme Court in Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. noted:
[The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970] sharply increased federal
authority and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air
pollution. Nonetheless, the Amendments explicitly preserved the
principle: "Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973). More relevant to this analysis is the canon which
requires any grant of state jurisdiction to be clearly expressed by Congress, Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1976). "State laws generally are not applicable to tribal
Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State
laws shall apply." MeClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170 (1973),
quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 21, at 845.
47. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).

48. See notes 12-18 supra.
49. See notes 22-27 supra.
50. Note, The Applicability of the Federal Pollution Acts to Indian Reservations:A Case
for Tribal Self-Government, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 63 (1976).
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State.... ." § 107(a) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1678,
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a). The difference under the Amendments was

that the States were no longer given any choice as to whether they

would meet this responsibility. For the first time they were required
to attain air quality of specified standards, and to do so within a

specified period of time.' 1
This state lead role has been even further strengthened in the recent
Clean Air Act Amendments. The Senate report noted:
The authority of States and localities to implement air pollution

control programs within the framework of a national policy must be
encouraged. The framework proposed in this bill is flexible in terms

of the discretion in choosing methods for attaining firm national
goals. States and localities are given broad discretion to make decisions, while maintaining the minimum national air quality baselines
designed to protect health and welfare, prevent discrimination
among States, protect national resources within States, and provide
guidance on the 5technical and the economic implications of various
national policies. 2
Adding support to the delegation argument are indications, in the
language of the statutes, of state responsibility over all lands in the
state. In addition to the "entire geographic area" language in section
107 of the Clean Air Act noted in the Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council case, section 303(e) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act requires the state to develop water quality implementation plans "for all navigable waters within such state" [emphasis
added] .' ' The Safe Drinking Water Act authorizes states to assume
primary enforcement of the safe drinking water regulations over
"public water systems within its jurisdiction."' ' The bottom line of
the states' argument is that EPA statutes were intended to give states
jurisdiction over any source on any land within the state including
Indian lands.
Returning to our McClanahan analysis, it is difficult to describe
this language as clear and express Congressional consent of state
jurisdiction. Certainly, expressness would require that Indian tribes
be mentioned in conjunction with the grant of jurisdiction. The
statute's mere definitional mention of Indians should not suffice.
An idea of the degree of expressness required can be gleaned from
the federal facilities section included in several of the acts. These
51.
52.
53.
54.

421 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1975).
S. REP. NO. 95-127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
33 U.S.C. §1313(e)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. §300g-4(1)(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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sections indicate that Congress well knew how to legislative for
historically protected lands such as federal lands, and Indian lands
are due an even greater degree of protection because of the federal
trust responsibility. The federal facility sections were recently the
subject of Supreme Court decisions that rule against the assumption
of state jurisdiction over the federal lands.
In the cases of Hancock v. Train"5 and EPA v. California ex rel.
State Water Resources Control Board,5 6 the states had argued
respectively that section 118 of the Clean Air Act" 7 and section
3131 1 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act require federal
agencies to comply with both substantive and procedural requirements of the state environmental laws. Both sections had employed
the term "requirements respecting control and abatement" of
pollution, and it was not clear whether this term referred to
procedural requirements in addition to substantive requirements. The
Supreme Court noted the ambiguity and held that a clear expression
of Congressional consent would be required.
In view of the undoubted congressional awareness of the requirement of clear language to bind the United States, our conclusion is
that with respect to subjecting federal installations to state permit
requirements, the Clean Air Act does not satisfy the traditional
requirement that such intention be evinced with satisfactory clarity.
Should this nevertheless be the desire of Congress, it need only
amend the Act to make its intention manifest. 5 9
Congress has subsequently expressed its intention that federal
agencies comply with all federal, state, and local environmental
requirements both substantive and procedural. 6 Congress also has
clarified its intentions regarding Indian lands in recent legislative
amendments noted below. 6 1
d. EPA Implementing Regulations
In spite of the ambiguities in the statutes, the question of
55. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
56. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
57. Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any
property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may
result, in the discharge of air pollutants, shall comply with Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abatement of air
pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements.
42 U.S.C. §1857f (1970).
58. 33 U.S.C. §1323 (Supp. V 1975). The language is almost identical to that of §118
of the Clean Air Act.
59. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 198 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
60. See note 106 infra.
61. See note 99 infra.
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jurisdiction over Indian lands has been addressed in implementing
regulations of several major EPA programs. 6 2 The treatment of the
tribal/state jurisdiction issue in the regulations indicates that EPA
does not consider its statutes to give states jurisdiction over Indian
lands.
The earliest mention of any EPA regulations of Indian tribes
appeared in the promulgation of 40 CFR Part 125, the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. 6 ' These regulations provided the federal procedures for the issuance of permits to discharge
pollutants under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Proposed
rules for this program did not mention Indian tribes in the
regulations themselves except in the definitions taken directly from
the Water Act.6 4 However, in the preamble to the proposed
rulemaking, it was noted that the states would not issue permits
"with respect to Federal agencies and instrumentalities, for which
the Administrator will continue to process permit applications in
accordance with these regulations and will be the exclusive source of
6
permits." s
It appears from this passage that the EPA was considering Indian
facilities as federal instrumentalities or at least that Indian facilities
should be treated similarly to federal facilities. In the interim between proposal and promulgation of the water permit regulations,
two cases were decided by the Supreme Court which basically elimi6
nated the doctrine that Indian tribes are federal instrumentalities. 6
Discussing the doctrine in terms of taxing of Indian enterprises,
Mescalero stated:
The theory was that a federal instrumentality was involved and that
the tax would interfere with the Government's realizing the
maximum return for its wards. This approach did not survive; its rise
and decline in Indian affairs is described and reflected in Helvering v.
Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938); ...where the
court cut to the bone the proposition that restricted Indian lands
62. Early drafts of regulations for programs under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 have also included a discussion of the authority of Indian tribes, but
these regulations have yet to be proposed.
63. 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528 (1973). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act requires any
person who intends to discharge any "pollutant" into navigable waters (broadly construed)
must obtain from EPA, or the state if delegated authority, a permit to discharge. The permit
will contain effluent limitations (that is, limits on the amount of pollutant to be discharged)
for each relevant pollutant. It will also normally require periodic self-monitoring. The person discharging selects his own means to meet the effluent limitations.
64. Proposed Reg. § 125.1(k), 38 Fed. Reg. 1362 (1973).
65. Id.
66. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
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and the proceeds from them were-as a matter of constitutional
law-automatically exempt from state taxation.61
The proper basis for protection of the tribes from the state permit
granting authority is not that they are federal instrumentalities, but
rather that, as McClanahan identified, namely the "backdrop of
tribal sovereignty" and that state jurisdiction had been pre-empted
by the applicable treaties and federal legislation. 6 This distinction
was clarified in section 125.2-Scope and Purpose-of the promulgated regulations.
The regulations in this part also prescribe the policy and procedures
to be followed in connection with permits authorizing discharges
into the navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the
oceans from any agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government and
from any Indian activity on Indian lands. (emphasis
69
added)

The regulations further stated that "[s]uch state [water permit]
programs do not cover agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal
Government and Indian activities on Indian lands under the
jurisdiction of the United States."" 0
The nature of state jurisdiction over Indian lands was addressed
more thoroughly one year later in the development of regulations for
the Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration." I In the first
EPA proposal of these regulations, a proposal that presented four
alternative regulatory schemes and that requested comments on these
alternatives, no mention of any sort was made of Indian tribes or
Indian lands in either the preamble or the text of the proposal.7 2
The extensive public comments received on the alternatives necessitated a reproposal of the regulations. 7 3 In the reproposal, Indian
tribes were discussed with regard to area designations and with regard
to review of new sources of air pollution.
The proposed regulations authorized "the appropriate Indian
governing body [to] ... submit to the Administrator a proposal to
67. Id. at 150.

68. An analogous rationale was used by the Supreme Court in Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
69. 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,530 (1973).
70. Id.

71. These regulations were published in response to an order of the District Court for the
District of Columbia, Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.Supp. 253 (D.C.D.C. 1972), aff'd
per curiam by an equally divided Courtsub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
72. Proposed Reg. §52.21, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,986 (1973).
73. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,000 (1974).
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redesignate areas Class I, Class II, or Class III.

.

.""

The preamble

commented that the regulations did not intend to convey authority
to states over Indian lands where such authority was not already
conferred by other federal statutes.7 I The rulemaking was recognizing that there is a distinction in authorities between the state,
federal, and Indian governing bodies.
In the final promulgation of the regulations for the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, the language was modified
somewhat from the proposal.
Nothing in this section is intended to convey authority to the states

over Indian reservations where States have not assumed such
authority under other laws nor is it intended to deny jurisdiction
which states have assumed under other laws. Where a state has not
assumed jurisdiction over an Indian Reservation the appropriate

Indian Governing Body may submit to the Administrator a proposal
to redesignate areas Class I, Class II, or Class III, provided that:
(a) The Indian Governing Body follows procedures equivalent to
those required of States under paragraphs (c)(3)(ii) and,
(b) Such redesignation is proposed after consultation with the

State(s) in which the Indian Reservation is located or which border
the Indian Reservation and, for those lands
held in trust, with the
76
approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
The preamble to the promulgation carefully noted that:
These regulations were not intended to alter the present legal
relationships between the States and Indian Reservations within the
States. As these relationships vary from State to State, EPA has not
attempted to define such relationships but has modified the

proposed regulations to clarify that there is no intent to alter these
relationships. 7 7
Without mentioning it, the state assumption of jurisdiction
language in the regulations was obviously referring to Public Law
280, which is the statutory means by which states may assume
jurisdiction over Indian reservations. 7 8 However, the regulation,
consistent with case law of 1974, stopped short of taking sides on
the issue of whether Public Law 280 did in fact confer jurisdiction to
a state for environmental purposes. The regulation instead took the
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 31,007, §52.21(c)(3)(vii).
Id. at 31,004.
40 C.F.R. §52.21(c)(3)(v) (1977), 39 Fed. Reg. 42,515 (1974).
39 Fed. Reg. 42,513 (1974).
See note 114 infra.
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moderate position of not attempting to alter the existing legal
relationships between the states and Indian reservations. EPA was
leaving resolution of that issue to the courts. 9
The preamble also noted the independent status of Indian lands
not subject to state laws. Nevertheless, a semblance of big brotherhood remained in that the regulations required the Indian tribe, prior
to redesignation of reservation lands, to consult with the state in
which the reservation is located and to obtain the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior.' I Furthermore, the regulation on its face
did not authorize Indian tribes to perform the new source review for
new or modified sources located on Indian reservations. Rather, the
regulation provided that "[s] uch procedures shall be administered by
the Administrator in cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior
with respect to lands over which the State has not assumed
jurisdiction under other laws." 8 1
Shortly after the regulations for the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration of Air Quality was promulgated, regulations were
proposed providing for the certification of pesticide applicators., 2
The preamble to the proposed regulations noted:
The problem of certifying applicators on Indian Reservations arose
during the development of the proposed regulations for submission
and approval of State plans. While States have primary responsibility
for conducting certification within their own political boundaries,
they do not always have jurisdiction over Indian Reservations within
those boundaries. 8 3

Therefore, the proposed regulation provided that the appropriate
Indian governing body could choose to utilize a state certification
program or to develop its own plan for certifying Indian applicators.
The preamble had noted that "[tihe certification plan to be
followed may depend upon the extent of State jurisdiction over
Indian Reservations within a State's political boundaries." 8 4 The
text of the regulation addressed some of these circumstances. 8 It
provided that where Indian land was subject to the jurisdiction of a
79. Congress would follow suit in 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. Cf. infra note
101.
80. 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c)(3)(v) (1977).
81. Id. §52.21(d)(4)(ii).
82. An additional set of regulations establishing a federal certification program for Indian
lands and states lacking approved plans was proposed recently. The regulations will set
authority for EPA to carry out certification and enforcement functions in lieu of the tribe
or state where necessary. Proposed Reg. § 171.11, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,873 (1977).
83. 40 Fed. Reg. 2528, 2530 (1975).

84. Id.
85. Proposed Reg. §171.10, 40 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1975).
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state, the applicators would be certified under the state's certification plan. It also provided that Indian applicators using pesticides
outside the reservation would have to be certified under the state
plan. This provision was consistent with the established line of case
law holding that Indians outside the reservation boundaries would be
subject to state jurisdiction.' 6 This provision was later deleted from
the promulgation of the regulations because the agency felt that
"certifications issued pursuant to Indian plans necessarily are valid
only within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Indian
Governing Body, just as in the case with certifications issued by
States." 8 7
Another provision of the proposed regulations significantly stated
that "[nion-Indian employees contracted to apply restricted use
pesticides on Indian Reservation lands not subject to State jurisdiction shall be certified either under a State certification plan accepted
by the Indian Governing Body or under the Indian Reservation
certification plan" (emphasis added).' 8 This provision was a bold
recognition by EPA that an Indian tribe could have jurisdiction over
non-Indians within a reservation, a position that was subject to
considerable legal debate at the time of the proposal and not wholly
consistent with the then official federal position.8 9
Except as noted, the proposed regulation was substantially
retained in the final promulgation. However, the promulgated
regulation required an Indian Governing Body that decided to utilize
the state certification program to enter into a cooperative agreement
with the state regarding funding and proper authority for enforcement of the certification program.9 The preamble noted that this
was inserted because
[a] State with a large number of Indian Reservations objected to the
wording of this section and the preamble discussion on the basis that
it implies that an Indian Governing Body can make a unilteral
decision as to whether or not it will utilize a particular State's
certification program or develop its own plan and program. It was

pointed out that the State involved should have a voice in the
matters since it would have to expend funds for the certification
86. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973) and U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 21, at 510-11.
87. 40 Fed. Reg. 11,698, 11,702 (1975).
88. Proposed Reg. §171.10(d), 40 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1975).
89. In 1970, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior held that tribes do not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservation lands, Opinion of the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior N-36810, 77 I.D. 113 (1970). See infra note 197.
90. But see note 172 infra.
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program and
would also need the proper authority for enforcement
9
purposes. 1

The preamble of the promulgation also noted that some state
officials had objected to tribal certification of non-Indian employees
who apply restricted-use pesticides on Indian reservations. The
preamble rejected the objection.
While some aspects of the legal relationships between States and

Indian Reservations remain to be resolved, it is the Agency's position
that in those instances where a State has not assumed jurisdiction
over a reservation under other Federal laws, that the Indian
Governing Body should have the opportunity to choose a certification plan covering all applicators on the reservation. This procedure
should provide adequate coverage of all restricted use pesticide
applicators on such Indian Reservations pending final resolution of
any outstanding legal questions. 9 2

Finally, consistent with the "let the courts do it" position of the
agency in earlier regulations, the pesticide regulations provide that
"[n]othing in this section is intended either to confer or deny
jurisdiction to the States over Indian Reservations not already
conferred or denied under other laws or treaties." 9
EPA also has addressed jurisdiction over Indian lands in Regulations for the Implementation of Drinking Water Standards. The
proposal of these regulations included no mention of Indian tribes. 9 4
However, the final promulgation, section 142.3, provided that, in
order to obtain enforcement responsibility for the drinking water
program, a state does not have to show authority over "public water
systems on Indian land with respect to which the State does not have
the necessary jurisdiction or its jurisdiction is in question. ....

"

I

The preamble merely noted that these systems would be regulated by
EPA.
The most recent inclusion of Indian Tribes in EPA regulations
occurred in the May 16, 1977 promulgation of regulations for the
identification and designation of regions and agencies for solid waste
planning and management. 9 6 The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act requires a statewide plan for solid waste management
and directs the governor to designate regions and agencies to conduct
regional planning where appropriate. 9 ' The regulations provide that
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

40 Fed. Reg. 11,702 (1975).
Id.
§171.10(d), 40 Fed. Reg. 11,704 (1975).
40 Fed. Reg. 33,228 (1975).
41 Fed. Reg. 2916, 2919 (1976).
42 Fed. Reg. 24,926 (1977).
42 U.S.C.A. §6946 (Supp. 1978).
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"[m] ajor Federal facilities and Native American Reservations should
be treated for the purposes of these guidelines as though they are
incorporated municipalities, and the facility director or administrator
should be considered the same as a locally elected official." 9
This provision is mostly non-regulatory, directed primarily toward
assuring local consultation and coordination. However, funding flows
to those designated. As usual, the statute does not provide an
alternative means for the designation and funding of Indian Tribes.
The appropriateness of designation of Tribes by a governor is
questionable in light of the states' lack of jurisdiction over Indian
lands.
e. 1977/1978 Amendments to EPA Statutes
Tribal expressions of concern about Indian sovereignty began to
have an effect on Congressional action during 1977 and 1978. For
the first time, Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act
and the Safe Drinking Water Act which included substantive
provisions regarding Indian lands in other than the definitional
sections. Congress also expressed concern about tribal sovereignty in
floor debates on proposed amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. In each case, Congress followed the agency's
prior buck-passing regarding state jurisdiction over Indian lands. But
Congress also rejected the notion that EPA statutes could serve as a
basis for state jurisdiction over Indian lands.
Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act have not
included any further mention of Indian tribes. However, a colloquy
during the Senate floor debate did confirm EPA's understanding of
state/tribal relations, namely, that the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act does not provide state jurisdiction over Indian lands.
Mr. ABOUREZK. On the Clean Water Act, I wanted to ask the
manager if there is anything in this act which in any way alters the
jurisdictional situation on the Indian reservations of the United
States.
Mr. ANDERSON. No.
Mr. ABOUREZK. It neither adds nor takes away jurisdiction,
whatever the situation might be?
Mr. ANDERSON. That is correct. 9 9
The potpourri amendments to the Clean Air Act signed into law
on August 7, 1977, included provision for air quality classification of
reservation lands by Indian tribes. Basically, this provision was a
98. §255.33, 42 Fed. Reg. 24,926, 24,930 (1977).
99. 123 CONG. REC. S13,605 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
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legislative enactment of a portion of the EPA regulation for
Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration which the EPA
had promulgated in 1976 in response to a federal court order. 1 0 0
The Prevention of Significant Deterioration section addressed the
need to protect good quality air from deterioration due to
construction of new pollutant emitting facilities. The EPA regulations had developed a scheme whereby lands with good air quality
would be classified under three classes. 1 0 1 All lands were initially
classified as Class II lands, which would have meant that only a small
amount of air quality deterioration from 1975 base levels would have
been permitted. The governing jurisdiction in the area could then opt
to take steps to redesignate that area as either Class I (pristine air
quality) or Class III (allowing air quality deterioration to the national
standard). Section 164 of the Clean Air Act Amendments preserved
the EPA regulatory provision that authorized Indian governing
bodies to so redesignate reservation lands. Subsection (c) authorized
Indian tribes to follow the same redesignation procedures provided
to the states. "Lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations
of federally recognized Indian tribes may be redesignated only by the
appropriate Indian governing body."' 02
Such redesignation, however, was subjected to the review of the
EPA Administrator whenever any bordering state affected by the
redesignation of the Indian lands objects to the redesignation. Subsection 165(e) requires the Administrator to resolve the dispute.' 03
In the House debate concerning adoption of the conference report of
the Clean Air Act Amendments, the manager of the House bill, Representative Paul G. Rogers, noted and qualified the Administrator's
review powers.
[I] t is intended that the Administrator's review of such determinations by tribal governments be exercised with utmost caution to
avoid unnecessarily substituting his judgment for that of the tribe.
The concept of Indian sovereignty over reservation lands is a critical
one, not only to native Americans, but to the government of the
100. Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
101. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,007 (1974), 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c)(3)(vii) (1977). See supra note

74.
102. 42 U.S.C.A. §7474(c) (Supp. 1977). The Northern Cheyenne Tribe had completed
redesignation to Class I for the Northern Cheyenne Reservation prior to enactment of the
Clean Air Act Amendments. The EPA Administrator's approval of the redesignation was
legislatively ratified in § 168(b) of the amendments. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7478 (Supp. 1978). The
Northern Cheyenne redesignation had been the subject of considerable congressional debate
because the redesignation to Class I potentially would have an adverse impact on proposed
construction of additional units at the Colstrip Power Plant, approximately 15 miles from
the Northern Cheyenne Reservation.
103. 42 U.S.C.A. §7474(e) (Supp. 1977).
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United States. A fundamental incident of that sovereignty is control
over the use of their air resources. . . . [T] he Administrator should

reverse the determination made by an Indian governing body to
reclassify its land, only under the most serious circumstances.' 04
Thus, federal supervision remains over tribal reclassification. The
Administrator has authority to modify or veto the tribe's decision to
reclassify. This is unlike the Administrator's review authority over
state reclassifications, where the Administrator may disapprove a
reclassification only if procedural requirements of the section have
not been met.' 0 5

Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act were particularly
interesting regarding Indian tribes. In an enigmatic little amendment,
Congress made clear its intentions concerning application of the Safe
Drinking Water Act to federal facilities, clarified the issue of state
jurisdiction over Indian lands, and completely exempted the Bureau
of Indian Affairs from the provisions of the act. The amendment is
also consistent with the Congressional tradition of ad hoc, patchwork
legislation for Indian affairs which only further contributes to the
difficulty of clearly understanding Indian law.' 06
(c)(1) Nothing in the Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977
shall be construed to alter or affect the status of American Indian

lands or water rights nor to waive any sovereignty over Indian lands
guaranteed by treaty or statute.

(2) For the purposes of this chapter, the term "Federal agency"
shall not be construed to refer to or include any American Indian
tribe, nor to the
Secretary of the Interior in his capacity as trustee of
0 7
Indian lands. '

Taking the second paragraph first, subparagraph (c)(2) simply says
that Indian tribes and the Secretary of Interior, in his capacity as
trustee of Indian lands, will not be defined as federal agencies for the
purposes of the Safe Drinking Water Act. On first reading subparagraph 2, it might appear that both Indian tribes and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs are completely exempted from the Safe Drinking
104. 123 CONG. REC. H8665 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. §7474(b)(1)(C)(2) (Supp. 1977).
106. This issue has arisen because some tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs had
become concerned that §8 of the Amendments-regarding federal facilities-would have
disastrous effects on the water flood injection and disposal wells employed in oil and gas
operations on Indian lands. They were concerned that they would be subject to state and
local enforcement. Their argument was that the BIA regulations governing mining (25
C.F.R. § § 171-84 (1977)) are stringent enough to prevent pollution from such operations.
123 CONG. REC. H6862 (daily ed. July 12, 1977).
107. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. §300j-6(c) (Supp.

1977).
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Water Act. A more careful reading reveals that the Secretary of
Interior, when acting as trustee, indeed is exempt from the Safe
Drinking Water Act. Because the term "federal agency" falls within
the term "person," wherever the act regulates persons, the Secretary
would be exempted from coverage. However, wherever the statute
regulates "public drinking water supplies," a literal reading of the act
would still cover the Secretary if the Secretary's activity falls under
the definition of "public drinking water supply." This is probably
not what Congress really intended, but the statute is so constructed. 1 0 8
Exemption of Indian tribes also was not achieved. It would have
been easy for Congress to say that no provision of the Safe Drinking
Water Act would apply to Indian tribes. They did not do this.
Rather, they said that Indian tribes are not "federal agencies" thus
precluding any argument that Indian tribes could be subject to state
substantive and procedural laws through the federal agency section.
In subparagraph (a), Congress bent over backwards to completely
avoid the whole complex subject of tribal/state jurisdiction.
The committee does not intend that this section alter or amend laws,
regulations, or treaties pertaining to the tribal water rights of
American Indian tribes or the established relationship between the
American Indian tribes and the United States in its special
relationship as trustee to those tribes. Furthermore, the committee
does not intend that this provision alter or amend any Federal or
State statute, regulation, State enabling statute or treaty pertaining
to American Indian tribal water systems and tribal water resource
management activities. Sovereignty over Indian lands guaranteed by
treaty or statute is in no way waived by this provision.' 0 9
Congress, well aware of the delicacies of tribal self-determination
and of disputes over state jurisdiction over Indian lands, is clearly
leaving any sovereignty issues for judicial rather than legislative
resolution. In sum, Congress did not want the Safe Drinking Water
Act to be interpreted as conferring to a state jurisdiction over Indian
lands.
108. It may be appropriate for the Secretary of Interior, as trustee, to be exempt from
the requirements of § 8. Without this exemption, the BIA, as a federal agency, would have
to comply with both the procedural and substantive requirements of state and local environmental law, providing in effect a backdoor application of state law to Indians.
109. H.R. REP. NO. 95-338, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3648, 3660. The use of the phrase "alter or affect the status of
American Indian lands" in subparagraph a is somewhat ambiguous. "Status" is not exactly a
term of art and could be interpreted liberally to mean that the Safe Drinking Water Act
should not apply to Indians. However, the legislative history indicates that the phrase was
meant to be read as the pre-existing legal status of Indian land and water rights.
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Other recent examples of Congress' sensitivity to the sovereignty
issues are the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(commonly known as the BLM Organic Act), 1 1 0 which requires the
Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to coordinate land use plans
with land use and management programs of adjacent Indian lands,
and the Surface Control and Mining Reclamation Act of 1977,111
which directs the Secretary of Interior
to study the question of the regulation of surface mining on Indian
lands which will achieve the purpose of this chapter and recognize
the special jurisdictional status of these lands. In carrying out this
study the Secretary shall consult with Indian tribes. The study
report shall include proposed legislation designed to allow Indian

tribes to elect to assume full regulatory authority over the
administration and enforcement of regulation of surface mining of
coal on Indian lands.' 12
The conference report on the strip mining act noted:
One reason that the Conferees agreed to the House version of the
Indian lands provision was that they did not want to change the
status quo with respect to jurisdiction over Indian lands both within
reservations and outside reservation boundaries. Nothing in the
study provision or any other part of H.R. 2 is intended to make any
such change.' 13
From the above analysis, it is clear that the present language of the
EPA statutes, the intentions of Congress, and the EPA's own
regulatory interpretation of its statutes do not confer to states'
environmental regulatory jurisdiction over Indian lands.
f. Public Law 280
Consistent with the then federal policy promoting termination of
separate Indian lands, Congress, in 1953, enacted PL 83-280.1 14 By
this act, six states were directly given, with some restrictions, civil
and criminal jurisdiction over Indian land. Thirty-six states were
empowered to assume jurisdiction over reservations by positive
enactment of state legislation. Eight states were empowered to
assume jurisdiction by amending their state constitutions to remove
110. 43 U.S.C.A. § § 1701-82 (Supp. 1978).
111. 30 U.S.C.A. § § 1201-1328 (Supp. 1978).
112. Id. §1300.
113. H.R. REP. NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 114,reprintedin [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 728, 746.
114. The pertinent portions are now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970) (civil jurisdiction) and 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) (criminal jurisdiction).
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disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian lands within their borders.'1
The less than clear guidelines of PL 83-280 have generated much
debate and litigation, and it is, therefore, not surprising that it should
be at the heart of the discussion of state and tribal jurisdiction over
environmental protection of Indian lands.
Earlier decisions did not agree on the extent of state jurisdiction
over Indian lands granted by the provisions of PL 83-280.1 16 The
case holdings and the relative positions of the federal government
and of the states whose jurisdictional claims are subject to PL 83-280
have been discussed in numerous other articles, and will not be
repeated here.' 17 However, recent federal cases now indicate a trend
toward restricting the breadth of state jurisdiction under PL 83-280.
These cases are Bryan v. Itasca County,' 18 Santa Rosa Band of
Indians v. Kings County,' 19 and United States v. Humboldt.' 20
In Bryan v. Itasca County, the question presented to the Supreme
Court was whether or not PL 83-280 constituted Congressional
consent for a state to tax personal property (a mobile home) of an
Indian on reservation trust land.' 21
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous court, indicated that
PL 280 does not grant states the authority to impose taxes on
reservation Indians. Reaffirming the judicial rule of construction that
115. Council of State Governments, State Environmental Issues Series: Indian Rights and
Claims 6 (1977).
116. Compare People v. Rhoades, 12 Cal.App.3d 720, 90 Cal.Rptr. 794 (3d Dist. 1970);
Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F.Supp. 371 (S.D.Cal. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cit. 1974); Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians'
Tribal Council v. City of Palm Springs, 347 F.Supp. 42 (C.D.Cal. 1972); Santa Rosa Band of
Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
117. See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. REV. 535 (1975); Comment, State Jurisdictionover Indian Land Use:

An Interpretation of the "Encumbrance" Savings Clause of Public Law 280, 9 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 421 (1974); Dolan, State JurisdictionOver Non-Indian Mineral Activities
on Indian Reservations, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 475 (1975); Chambers, Federal
EnvironmentalRegulation of Mineral Resources Development with Particular Emphasis on
Indian Lands in ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON
WESTERN COAL DEVELOPMENT 35 (1973); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN INDIAN JURISDICTION 33-37 (1974).
118. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
119. 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
120. Civil No. C-74-2526-RFP (Sept. 10, 1976). The Humboldt case was a federal district
court ruling that Humboldt County, California did not have authority under Public Law 280
to impose its land use laws on tribal lands within the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. The
court held that neither the state nor the county could enforce zoning ordinances, building
permit ordinances, or the state Environmental Quality Act on tribal trust lands.
121. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). The State of Minnesota had pursued this case out of concern
not only for the state's taxing authority, but also a range of other state civil regulatory
authorities, such as land use planning and health regulation. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE SERIES: INDIAN RIGHTS AND
CLAIMS 10 (1977).
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ambiguous statutes should be construed favorably toward the
Indians, the Court found that neither PL 280 on its face nor its
legislative history indicated any Congressional intention to confer
taxing authority
upon the states over personal property of Indians on
1
a reservation. 22
Ample application of the Bryan decision to environmental issues
regarding Indian lands can be found both in the Court's rationale and
in the strong dicta. First of all, the Court culls from the legislative
history an important distinction between private causes of action and
general state regulatory authority, finding that section 4(a) of PL
280 granted those states jurisdiction only over the former.
With this as the primary focus of §4(a), the wording that follows in
§4(a)-"and those civil laws of such State ... that are of general
application to private persons or private property shall have the same
force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere
within the State"-authorizes application by the state courts of their
rules of decision to decide such disputes. 10 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
This construction finds support in the consistent and uncontradicted
references in the legislative history to "permitting" "State courts to
adjudicate civil controversies" arising on Indian reservations, H.R.
Rep. No. 848, pp. 5, 6 (emphasis added), and the absence of
anything remotely resembling an intention to 1confer general state
civil regulatory control over Indian reservations. 23
State environmental statutes fall into the latter category of general
state civil regulatory authority 1 24 and thus are outside the ambit of
the PL 280 grant of jurisdiction. By defining the limits of jurisdiction
granted to PL 280 states, Congress continued to reserve to the
federal government or the tribes jurisdiction not so granted.1 2 5
Secondly, in reviewing the legislative history of Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 19681 26 as it related to section 4, the Court
122. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976).
123. Id. at 383-84. The internal footnote is interesting:
'Cf. Israel & Smithson, supra, n. 8, at 296:
"A fair reading of these two clauses suggests that Congress never intended
'civil laws' to mean the entire array of state noncriminal laws, but rather that
Congress intended 'civil laws' to mean those laws which have to do with
private rights and status. Therefore, 'civil laws ... of general application to
private persons or private property' would include the laws of contract, tort,
marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc., but would not include laws declaring or implementing the states' sovereign powers, such as the power to tax,
grant franchises, etc. These are not within the fair meaning of 'private' laws."
124. The EPA statutes authorize criminal as well as civil enforcement powers, although
the major emphasis is civil regulation. Cf United States v. Atlantic Richfield, 429 F.Supp.
830 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
125. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Kennerly v.
District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
126. 25 U.S.C. § §1301-41 (1970).
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notes the following passage quoting Senator Ervin, the principal
sponsor of Title IV.
Certain representatives of municipalities have charged that the
repeal of [§7 of] Public Law 280 would hamper air and water
pollution controls and provide a haven for undesirable, unrestricted
business establishments within tribal land borders. Not only does
this assertion show the lack of faith that certain cities have in the
ability and desire of Indian tribes to better themselves and their
environment, but, most importantly, it is irrelevant, since Public

Law 280 relates primarily to the application of state civil and
criminal law in court proceedings, and has no bearing on programs
set up by the States to assist economic and environmental development in Indian territory." (Emphasis added.) Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, No. 90-23, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 136 (1968).' 27
The Bryan Court cites this passage as supportive of its proposition
that Section 4 jurisdiction acquired under Title IV cannot be
construed as extending general state civil regulatory authority.
It is also of importance for environmental questions that the court
in Bryan cited the Santa Rosa case three times.1 2' The Santa Rosa
case, a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that
neither the state nor its political subdivisions would have jurisdiction
under PL 280 or 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 to apply state or local land use
controls to Indian property within an Indian reservation.' 29 The
argument of the Ninth Circuit was similar to the rationale of the
Court in Bryan, namely, that states are without jurisdiction over
Indian lands unless such jurisdiction is expressly granted by
Congress.' 30 However, the Santa Rosa court also placed great weight
on the term "encumbrance," which appears in the savings clause of
PL 280.13 1 The court held that the term "encumbrance" should be
broadly construed. 32
127. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 387 (1976).
128. Id. at 388 and 388-89 n.14.
129. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
130. Id. at 658.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970) (the "savings clause" of Public Law 280):
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or
taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging
to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust
by the United States, or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed
by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute
or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction
upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the
ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
132. See note 117 supra.
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491

Relying on the canon of construction applied in favor of Indians, the
Court has ruled in different contexts that the word "encumbrance"
is to be broadly construed and is not limited to a burden which
hinders alienation of the fee. . . . Following the Court's lead, and
resolving, as we must, doubts in favor of the Indians, we think that
the word as used here may reasonably be interpreted to deny the
state the power to apply zoning regulations to trust property.
...Consequently, a construction of the term "encumbrance"
more
1
consonant with present congressional policy is mandated. 33

The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorarion the Santa Rosa
case.' 3, Environmental regulation is certainly very akin to land use
regulation, ' 3 s and it is reasonable to infer that the broad interpretation of the savings clause in the land use cases would equally apply to
environmental issues.
Therefore, the Bryan and Santa Rosa cases appear to recognize
pre-emption of state environmental regulation of Indian reservations
for two reasons: state civil regulation was not intended by Congress
to be within the scope of PL 280, and the savings clause of PL 280
specifically prohibits encumbrance of Indian land and water resources. 136

g. Other FederalStatutes
Other federal statutes have been suggested as possible bases for
state civil jurisdiction over activities on Indian land. 1 3 7 In 1950 the
State of New York was granted civil jurisdiction over Indian
tribes.1 38 This act, now codified at 25 U.S.C. § § 232 and 233, was
among a series of termination oriented acts, and was envisioned as a
forerunner of the grant of jurisdiction to states by PL 83-280 in
1953.'3I
However, there are several differences in wording in
sections 232 and 233, which, on their face, could be read to confer a
slightly broader scope of jurisdiction than the language of PL 83-280.
133. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 667-68 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
134. Id.
135. See EPA Report, EPA Programs Related to State, Regional and Local Planning
(1975); LaFrance, Zoning Authority Over Fee Lands Within Reservation Boundaries (paper
presented at Indian Law Seminar, Boulder, Colo. 1977).
136. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 658-59 n.2 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
137. It may be that the State of Oklahoma has general civil jurisdiction over Indian lands
within the state, but analysis of the numerous statutes regarding Oklahoma is beyond the
scope of this article. Cf American Indian Policy Review Commission, supra note 20, at 120.
138. Act of Sept. 13, 1950, 64 Stat. 845.
139. For a general discussion of the origins of Pub. L. No. 83-280, see COMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND REPORT ON PUBLIC LAW 280,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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For example, the savings clause of section 233 covers about the same
subject matter as does that of PL 280.1 40 However, the key term
"encumbrance" from the proviso of PL 280 does not appear in
section 233, but much narrow encumbrance-type language does
appear: "Provided further, that nothing herein contained shall be
construed as subjecting the land within any Indian reservation in the
State of New York to ...execution on any judgment rendered in the
state court ...."' 41 This language would argue against a broadening
of the savings clause to prohibit state environmental jurisdiction, as is
done under PL 83-280.
The few federal cases reported under these sections do not help
determine whether New York would have jurisdiction for environmental purposes. The District Court in Seneca Nation of Indians v.
State found that section 233 did not authorize the state to apply the
New York highway law to Indian lands.' 4 2 However, the issue there
was alienation of Indian land by state appropriation of Indian land in
connection with construction of a highway.
[T]his Act does not authorize New York to appropriate land
belonging to the Indians under the Highway Law because it contains
a proviso which explicitly prohibits New York from applying any
law which will result in the alienation of Indian land....
... "[u] nder the penultimate proviso [of the 1950 Act] the matter
of alienating tribal reservation lands would
appear to have been left
14
precisely where it was prior to the act." 3

The "encumbrance" issue apparently has not been litigated in the
federal courts. The Solicitor's Office of the Department of Interior
has recently reviewed section 233 in conjunction with an opinion
regarding the applicability of the Federal Metal and Non-metallic
Mine Safety Act to Indian lands. The Interior Department has taken
the position that the state regulatory program for mining safety
would not apply to federal Indian reservations within the State of
New York.
The Statute confers civil jurisdiction ... in civil actions and proceedings between Indians or between one or more Indians and any other
person or persons. . . . In general, the word person used in a statute
140.
141.
142.
143.

(1974).

See note 131 supra.
See note 138 supra.
397 F. Supp. 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 687, quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 680

July 19781

INDIAN LANDS ENVIRONMENT

will not be construed so as to include the United States or a state or
an agency thereof. In addition, it is a long established rule of
statutory construction that when the word "person" is used in a
legislative act, natural persons are intended unless something appears
in the context to show that the statute applies to artificial persons.
Corporations are an exception to this rule. Accordingly, 25 U.S.C.
233 does not provide authority to state courts to hear and decide
civil actions in which the United States of America, or the State of
New York
including the New York State Department of Labor, are
1
parties. 44
An analogous argument could be made for state environmental
protection regulations since ultimately it will be the state which
would be enforcing the environmental standards or regulations in a
state court, and according to the Department of Interior, a state is
not a "person" under 25 U.S.C. § 233. The Interior position denying
5
the state regulatory jurisdiction is consistent with the Bryan case' 4
and with the current federal policy of Indian self-determination.1 4 6
Whether a court ruling on this issue would give greater weight to this
argument or to the argument that the savings clause of section 233 is
fundamentally different from the savings clause of PL 83-280, in that
it lacks the "encumbrance" language, is unknown. However, from a
policy viewpoint it is much easier for EPA to have a uniform position
that neither PL 83-280 nor 25 U.S.C. § 233 would grant state
environmental regulatory jurisdiction over Indian lands.
Title 25 U.S.C. § 231 authorizes states, under regulations of the
Department of Interior, to apply state health and sanitation laws on
Indian reservations.' I However, a 1969 opinion of the Solicitor of
the Department of Interior indicated that this statute was not
self-executing and, in the absence of implementing regulations, could
not serve as a source of authority to enforce state health and
sanitation laws in Indian country."'4
Although prior to 1956
regulations implementing the health portion of this section were in
force, they have been withdrawn, and currently no health regulation
144. Unpublished opinion.
145. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
146. See generally Comment, The New York Indians' Right to Self-Determination, 22

BUFFALO L. REV. 985 (1973).
147. The Secretary of the Interior, under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe, shall permit the agents and employees of any State to enter upon
Indian tribal lands, reservations, or allotments therein (1) for the purpose of
making inspection of health and education conditions and enforcing sanitation and quarantine regulations....

25 U.S.C. §231 (1970).
148. Opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior M-36768 (unpublished
1969).
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exists that implements section 23 1.1 4 1 No case has clearly ruled on
this section, although it was discussed by Justices Douglas and White
in a dissent to the denial of certiorari in Snohomish County v. Seattle
Disposal Company:
There may also be merit to the dissent's view that the immunity of
Indian lands to a state "encumbrance" cannot frustrate state
programs to check air and water pollution. The States should,
perhaps, be able to prevent sewage dumped on Indians' lands from
draining into streams which flow into water supplies outside Indian
lands. The same is true of smoke from garbage burned on Indian
lands that contributes to smog over nearby cities. State controls in
this area may be permissible by virtue of 25 U.S.C. §231, whether
or not they are achieved under the label "zoning" rather than
"sanitation regulations."
The Solicitor General, in a memorandum expressing the views of the
United States, asserts that the decision below was correct because it
accorded with an administrative regulation of the Department of the
Interior. This regulation provides that no local zoning ordinance
shall be applicable to land leased from an Indian tribe where, as here,
the land is held in trust by or is subjected to a restriction against
alienation by the United States. The Supreme Court of Washington
did not rely on this regulation, and whether it is valid or unduly
restricts the state authority conferred by Public Law 280 and 25
U.S.C. §231 is an important federal question this Court should
decide. I would grant certiorari.' so
The dissent of two justices to denial of ceriorari does not, of
course, carry great precedential weight, and the interpretation by the
Department of Interior of their statutory authority probably would
be given some deference.' s
h. The Williams Test
Even though the foregoing analysis would indicate that states are
pre-empted from asserting environmental jurisdiction over Indians or
Indian trust lands, the Williams case1 2 is of interest to environmental regulation because frequently, the source of environmental
pollution within an Indian reservation is non-Indian owned.
McClanahan carefully distinguished this situation from the issue of
149. There is, however, a regulation implementing 25 U.S.C. §231 in the education area:

25 C.F.R. §273.52 (1977).
150. 389 U.S. 1016, 1019-20 (1967).
151. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
152. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The case involved the attempt by a nonIndian store owner on the reservation to collect in state courts a debt for goods sold to an
Indian.
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state jurisdiction over Indian trust lands. The court in McClanahan
summarized four situations where the state would have jurisdiction
over Indians or non-Indians within the reservations: (1) Indians have
left or never inhabited their reservation; (2) a tribe does not possess
the usual accouterments of tribal self-government; (3) the activities
undertaken by reservation Indians are on non-reservation lands; and,
(4) the exertion of state's jurisdiction is over non-Indians who
undertake activity on Indian reservations. 1 33 Regarding environmental issues, the first three of these situations should not present
any obvious problems for conflicting jurisdiction. However, the
fourth, state regulation of non-Indian activities on Indian lands, is
not always so clear.
In McClanahan, the Supreme Court went out of its way to apply
and limit the Williams test to this type of situation.
It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test have
dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians. See also
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S., at 75-76. In these
situations, both the tribe and the state could fairly claim an interest
in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was
designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could
protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government
would be affected.' 54
The Williams standard has proven in practice to be somewhat
nebulous. "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them." ' s This language was restated in Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones. "The upshot has been the repeated statements of this Court to
the effect that, even on reservati6ns, state laws may be applied unless
such application would interfere with reservation self-government or
would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law."' 5 6
There are no cases interpreting state environmental activities over
non-Indians within a reservation, but when such a case does arise, no
doubt the nexus of the regulated activiities to tribal government, the
strength of the tribal government, the bearing of the federal
environmental act, the history of state action on that particular
reservation, and the degree of state interest will be determinative in
any such ruling.
153.
154.
155.
156.

411 U.S. 164 (1973).
Id. at 179.
358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
411 U.S. 145,148 (1973).
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If upheld on appeal, a recent Washington Federal District Court
case could lend considerable guidance to determining relative state
and Tribal authorities. In Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation v. Washington 1s 7 the Court considered another "cigarette tax" dispute involving the cigarette tax ordinances of several
Washington tribes and the state's tax regulation. The court found the
state regulation to be an infringement of tribal self-government under
Williams. The court noted that Williams requires proof by the tribe,
or concession by the state, that the state regulation causes actual
interference with performance of tribal governmental obligations.
"Merely theoretical conceptions of interference with the functions of
... government" will not suffice to strike the state regulation.' 5 8
More important, however, was the court's extended analysis of
tribal pre-emption of state regulation. The court posited a dual
benchmark for determining the existence of tribal pre-emption: (a) is
the tribal ordinance enacted under a valid delegation of power from
Congress, and (b) does the ordinance establish a comprehensive program or scheme regulating the entire reservation.' I I If both tests are
met, then the state regulation is pre-empted. If upheld, this could
become a useful test in a very difficult area of Indian law.
Under either Williams or Colville, the factual circumstances are
very important to the determination. A few environmental examples
will illustrate the difficulty of determining "infringement."
Section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act requires
states and regional planning entities to develop a water quality management plan.' 60 Congress intended in section 208 that all parts of
the state be subject to water quality planning although the act does
not address the distinctive nature of Indian or federal lands.' 61 The
section further provides that it is the responsibility of the governor
of state to designate areas of the state for more intensive planning. 6 Although no Indian reservations were so designated by
governors, areas designated in some states included Indian lands.' 6 3
Probably such designations of Indian land by a governor are beyond
the authority of a state.
157. 446 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978).

158. Id. at 1363.
159. Id. at 1360-62.
160. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Supp. V 1975).
161. Natural Resources Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1386 (D.C.D.C. 1975).
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Supp. V 1975). The planning process is to include an assessment
of water quality in the defined area, a classification of streams by levels of water quality, an
analysis of point and non-point sources of water pollutants, the development of controls
and regulatory programs for identified pollutants, and extensive public participation in the
development of the plan.
163. All or portions of the following reservations were included in designated planning
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However, the real question is who has authority to conduct the
planning for the fee lands and non-Indian communities within the
reservation boundaries. Certainly, given the flow of streams and
pollutants across jurisdictional boundaries, the state could have a
legitimate interest in such planning. But the interests of tribes in the
waters flowing through the reservation have a preferred status dating
back to the Indian treaties.' 64 Therefore, any comprehensive tribal
planning of the use or quality of their waters should serve to preempt any state activity within the reservation even if the state planning would be restricted to the waters of non-Indian lands. If a tribe
takes no planning or regulatory action regarding water quality or
only acts haphazardly, it would leave open the question of whether
non-Indian communities within the reservation could participate in
state directed water quality planning for their lands.
A second example involves major sources of air pollution. For
certain categories of polluters, EPA has established new source performance standards that set air pollution emission limitations for the
sources.' I I Normally, EPA delegates states the authority to review
the ability of these sources to meet the new source performance
standards.'166 Nothing in the Clean Air Act or the regulations indicates how sources constructed within an Indian reservation are to be
reviewed. However, consistent with the water permit regulations,, 67
it is unlikely that EPA would allow a state to perform the new source
review of a facility to be located within a reservation. A fossil fuel
power plant to be located at a coal mine within a reservation serves
as a good example. If the plant were located on trust lands, it is
unlikely that the state would be able to assert jurisdiction over the
facility. This is because provisions in the lease of the land by the
facility would probably include environmental restrictions,' 68 and
these restrictions would constitute tribal governmental action. Any
areas in Region VIII of EPA: Flathead, Crow and Northern Cheyenne in Montana; Uintah
and Ouray in Utah; and Fort Berthold in North Dakota. Each of these reservations is
receiving planning funds through the designated planning agency, normally a council of
governments.
164. Pelcyger, Indian Water Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 743 (1975).
165. 42 U.S.C. §1857c-6 (1970).
166. Id.
167. 40 C.F.R. §125.2 (1977).
168. Prior to approval of any lease or extension of an existing lease pursuant of
(sic) this section, the Secretary of the Interior shall first satisfy himself that
adequate consideration has been given to the relationship between the use of
the leased lands and the use of neighboring lands; ... the effect on the
environment of the uses to which the leased lands will be subject.
25 U.S.C. §415 (1970).
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state review of the same facility would constitute an infringement on
this tribal action. If the tribe itself was participating in the construction or operation of the power plant, any action by the state would
certainly constitute an infringement.
If the power plant is located on fee lands within the reservation, if
there is no tribal interest or benefit deriving from the plant, and if
the tribe has taken no regulatory action regarding air quality, then
the legitimate state interest in the impact of the plant on nearby
non-reservation lands may be a sufficient basis for state jurisdiction
over the plant.
A third example is the regulation of persons applying pesticides.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act requires
each state to develop a plan for the certification of pesticide applicators. 1 69 No person may use a "restricted" pesticide unless he has
first participated in a training course or taken a test and received a
certificate of his ability to use pesticides. 1 7" The implementing regulations for this program authorize Indian tribes to undertake a
certification program themselves or to enter into a cooperative effort
1
with a state. 7
The enforcement question is a tough one in the certification
program. Even if a tribe entered into a cooperative agreement with
the state, the tribe could not authorize state enforcement because
only an act of Congress can give a state jurisdiction over Indians on
Indian lands.' 72 However, the tribe could accept the certification of
the state and perform its own enforcement functions. Independent
of a cooperative agreement, the state probably would be unable to
enforce its certification program against a non-Indian person using
pesticides on leased trust lands because the state's exercise of jurisdiction would again interfere with a lease provision and thus constitute an "infringement." However, if the non-Indian were using pesticides on fee lands and if the tribe did not have a reservation-wide
certification program, exercise of state jurisdiction should not
infringe upon tribal self-government. The legitimate state interest
here would be those of the health of state citizens and crop and
livestock protection. Under Colville, the state enforcement in this
latter case would not constitute an unconstitutional burden on tribal
government.
As Indians become more aware of state and federal programs,
169.
170.
171.
172.

7 U.S.C. §136b (Supp. V 1975).
Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 171 (1977).
See note 84 supra.
Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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lawsuits over jurisdiction are certain to arise. It will be interesting to
see how the courts sort out the complexities.
TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE RESERVATION ENVIRONMENT

In the long run, the best approach for environmental protection of
Indian lands will be development -by the tribes of their own environmental programs and expertise. There is little question about their
authority to do so.
It is fundamental that Indian tribes have inherent powers to
govern themselves. 1 7 3 These powers may be limited by federal
statute, treaty provisions, or provisions of the tribal constitution.' 71
Tribal powers may also be augmented by specific federal statute or
regulation. ' 71
Although the authority of Indian tribes in the environmental area
has yet to be extensively discussed in case, comment, or statutory
provision, other analogous tribal powers have been well established
by case law, and there are no present federal statutes1 that would
limit tribal powers to protect reservation environments. 76
Tribes have considerable latitude in regulating the use of the tribal
property. Powers to regulate and tax commercial activities within the
reservation are fairly well established,'' 7 although the provisions of
sections 261-264 of Title 25 of the U.S. Code, authorizing the
Bureau of Indian Affairs to regulate the activities of certain commercial traders on Indian reservations, raise questions about the division of authority in this area between the Bureau of Indian Affairs
and tribes.' 7 8
Tribal powers in the land use area provide the most direct analogy
to environmental regulation. Tribal land use authorities have been,
from time to time, question, mainly in conjunction with the grant of
state jurisdiction in PL 83-280.17' After the enactment of PL
83-280, case law results were mixed with several federal California
173. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942).
174. Manual of Indian Law, ch. 1, A-2, A-4 (1976).

175. Id. at A-2.
176. It could be argued, however, that the comprehensive federal environmental legislation pre-empts Indian tribes just as it does the states. Cf. Note, Indian Coal Authorities: The

Concept of Federal Preemption and Independent Tribal Coal Development on the Northern
GreatPlains, 53 N.D. L. REV. 469 (1977).
177. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cit.
1905); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cit. 1958),

cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959).
178. Manual of Indian Law, at A-6.

179. Id. But see LaFrance,supra note 135.
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cases ruling in favor of state and local land use authorities over the
tribe.' 80 But the disparity has now been resolved by the Santa Rosa
case, which has reaffirmed tribal authorities in land use regulation.1I8
No limitations on a tribe's powers of environmental regulation are
apparent, and, in fact, a few tribes have taken legislative steps to
protect reservation environment.' 82 There are, however, practical
difficulties facing tribes which will probably have the result, for the
time being, of discouraging most tribes from regulating reservation
environment. The first hurdle is the lack of motivation in the tribal
infrastructure. Most tribes see immediate economic and social problems as a higher priority than environmental regulation. Some tribes
probably do not have or do not perceive any environmental problems
on their reservation as warranting environmental control. Other
tribes that do have serious environmental problems may not recognize the problem or may not see any gain to the tribe from environmental regulation. The lack of manpower skills and technical experience in the environmental field is a prevailing but decreasing problem
with Indian tribes.' 8 I This problem is coupled with a frequent lack
of trust of outside expertise, including, in many cases, distrust of the
environmental expertise of the federal government.' 84
Some tribes face internal roadblocks to tribal environmental
action through pressure brought to bear on the tribal council by
Indian entrepreneurs and lease holders who enjoy their relative lack
of regulation and competitive advantage and who oppose any regulation, environmental or otherwise, which would complicate or increase the cost of their enterprise. Indian allottees are equally
undesirous of impairing in any way the leasability of their portion of
a grazing unit. All too often, the income from their leased land
constitutes a major portion or even all of their total income.
A second hurdle is the common ambiguity in general federal
statutes over eligibility of tribes for grant funds. The EPA statutes
authorize grant funds under a variety of programs. With the exception of the Toxic Substances Control Act, each of the acts provide
180. See note 116 supra.
181. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 664 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
182. See note 2 supra.
183. FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION,
TASK FORCE SEVEN: RESERVATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION 110 (1976); A. SORKIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL AID 104-35
(1971).
184. FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION,

supra note 183, at 91.
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program management grants designed to enable the states to carry
out their responsibilities under the act.1 8s However, the authorization for most of these program management grants only provides for
grants to states, and Indian tribes are not included in the definition
of "state" under the acts. The Clean Air Act is slightly different,
providing for program management grants to "air pollution control
agencies," the definition of which could be interpreted to include an
Indian tribe.' 86
Tribes are eligible and have received EPA grant funds under a
variety of other grant programs. Many tribes have received monies
for water quality planning on reservation lands.' 8 Training grants
and research/demonstration project funds have been received by
tribes.' 88 Tribes are also eligible for 75% federal funding of wastewater treatment plants construction under section 201 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act,1 89 although there is a major hurdle to
tribes receiving this funding in that the tribal project must appear on
a state priority list, which is an annual ranking in the order of need
prepared by the state of all proposed projects desiring federal funding.I 9 0 Tribes have objected to the application of these procedures
to Indian projects on grounds of inequality of treatment and of
inconsistency with Indian law. And even where a grant program
clearly applies to Indian tribes, frequently the amount of funds available and the number of entities competing for the funds diminish the
attractiveness of attempting to obtain the funds.' 9 '
185. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (Supp. V 1975) (water program grants); 42 U.S.C. § 1857c
(1970) (air program grants).
186. "The term 'air pollution control agency' means any of the following:... (3) A city,
county, or other local government health authority, or, in the case of any city, county, or
other local goverment in which there is an agency other than the health authority charged
with responsibility for enforcing ordinances or laws relating to the prevention and control of
air pollution, such other agency;. .. ." 42 U.S.C. §1857h(b) (1970). In January, 1978, the
Navajo Tribe was notified by EPA that they would be eligible for grant funds under this
section.
187. The Regional EPA Office in Denver, Colo., has made planning money available to
all 25 reservations in its six state region.
188. The Northern Cheyenne tribe is conducting a hydrology study under EPA research
funds. Other Indians have been trained in treatment plant operation and management of
solid waste.
189. 33 U.S.C. §1281 (1970).
190. 33 U.S.C. § 1284 (1970).
191. Proposed amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
would significantly place Indian tribes on an equal footing with states:
SEC. 23. STATE COOPERATION, AID, AND TRAINING
(a) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.-The Administrator is authorized to enter into cooperative agreements with States and Indian tribes(1) to delegate to any State or Indian tribe the authority to cooperate
in the enforcement of this Act through the use of its personnel or
facilities, to train personnel of the State or Indian tribe to cooperate in
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A third major hurdle is the present uncertainty regarding the
extent of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservation
boundaries. In the first place, tribal constitutions normally have not
authorized tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians.' 92 The law and
order codes that have been adopted by many tribes practically verbatim from 25 C.F.R. § 11.2, provide for jurisdiction only over Indian
persons.'9 3 Even if a tribal constitution specifically authorizes jurisdiction over non-Indians, it is not yet certain that such jurisdiction is
valid. The question is an important one because in many instances
the enterprises within a reservation which would cause significant
pollution are owned or operated by non-Indians.' 9
It is surprising that the civil and criminal authority of a tribe over
non-Indians within a reservation has not been squarely addressed in
Indian case law until quite recently. The civil jurisdiction of a tribe
over non-Indians has been strongly implied by dicta in Williams v.
Lee' 9 s and more recently in United States v. Mazurie, 1 9 6 where the
Supreme Court upheld tribal authority to require a liquor license of a
non-Indian owned tavern within the reservation.
As late as 1970 the Solicitor of the Department of Interior held
that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on
reservation lands.' 9 7 However, when the case of Oliphant v. Schlie
was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, upholding tribal criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian committing a criminal act on trust lands within the reservation,' 9 8 the Interior Department withdrew the
the enforcement of this Act, and to assist States and Indian tribes in
implementing cooperative enforcement programs through grants-in-aid;
and
(2) to assist State and Indian tribal agencies in developing and administering State or Indian tribal programs for training and certification of
applicators consistent with the standards the Administrator prescribes.
(b) CONTRACTS FOR TRAINING.-In addition, the Administrator is
authorized to enter into contracts with Federal, State, or Indian tribal agencies for the purpose of encouraging the training of certified applicators.
192. For example, the Tribal Constitution of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation provides: "The Fort Berthold Indian Court shall have jurisdiction of
all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the Three Affiliated Tribes or an Indian over
whom the Court has jurisdiction, and of all other suits between members and non-members
brought before the Court by stipulation of the parties." Ch. II, Judicial Procedure, Civil.
193. 25 C.F.R. §11.2 (1977). Jurisdiction provides: "A Court of Indian Offenses shall
have jurisdiction over all offenses enumerated in § § 11.38-11.87NH, when committed by
any Indian, within the reservation or reservations for which the court is established .. ." Id.
194. Non-Indian owned lands may be subject to state jurisdiction. See discussion accompanying note 153 supra.
195. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
196. 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
197. Opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior N-36810, 77 I.D. 113
(1970).
198. 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
98 S.Ct. 1011 (1978).
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opinion." 99 The Supreme Court has now reversed the Ninth Circuit,
holding that Indian tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction to
try and punish non-Indians and that they may not assume such jurisdiction unless specifically authorized by Congress. 2 00
The decision in Oliphant relied heavily on the long-standing presumption of the courts, Congress and the Executive Branch that
tribal courts lack power to try non-Indians. The same presumption
has not prevailed in civil matters and, therefore, it is unlikely that the
same result would apply to a tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians,
including environmental regulation. Indeed, the Colville case mentioned above (decided two weeks before Oliphant) strongly affirmed
the tribe's civil tax regulation over non-Indians.2 01
The final report of the American Indian Policy Review Commission addressed this issue, finding:
that the growth and development of tribal government into fullyfunctioning governments necessarily encompasses [sic] the exercise
of some tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian people and property
within reservation boundaries. The tribes must accept the fact and
operate under the assumption that the jurisdiction they assert over
non-Indians must bear a reasonable relationship to legitimate tribal
interests such as protection of trust resources, maintenance of law
of services and protection of tribal government
and order,2 0 delivery
2
generally.

One final danger to tribal exercise of authority over environmental
protection of reservation lands should be noted. It is generally agreed
that a tribe's inherent powers are preserved even though it does not
exercise them. 2 03 However, courts may be reluctant to defend unexercised powers in the face of a strong attack by other competing
interests. When they want to, courts can find tangential means to
strip or limit a power, especially when a significant national interest
such as energy needs are at stake.
CONCLUSIONS
The best environmental protection of Indian lands will normally
be achieved through environmental action by those most interested
in the land, in this case, by the tribes themselves protecting their own
land. Hopefully, where environmental problems exist or arise on a
reservation, tribes will exercise their legitimate authorities.
199. Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 1017 n.11 (1978).
200. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 98 S.Ct. 1011 (1978).
201. Supra note 157.
202. FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION,
supra note 183, at 143.
203. Fischer v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).

504

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

Even if tribes do enact environmental programs, it is likely states
will still try to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian owned or operated sources if these sources constitute a major pollution source or a
serious environmental problem. The current trend of analogous
Indian law cases indicates that states' jurisdiction even over nonIndian activities within a reservation will be curtailed in environmental issues.
Although the EPA has authority to apply federal standards to
pollution sources within a reservation, it is not likely that EPA will
take a strong enforcement position except where serious environmental problems exist. To date, EPA has not shown an inclination to
unilaterally impose economically burdensome controls on Indian
activities. There is no reason to suspect that the pattern followed in
EPA's dealings with states and localities will change when it comes to
environmental issues on Indian lands. All environmental problems
cannot be solved at the same time, so environmental problems on
Indian lands must be addressed one at a time in order of highest
priority.

